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Standing Still-Did the Roberts
Court Narrow, but Not Overrule,
Flast to Allow Time to Re-think
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence?
Douglas W. Kmiec*
The Roberts Court has yet to take up the confusion that inhabits
religion-clause jurisprudence. The primary case to be discussed here comes
at the subject matter indirectly, but importantly, through the issue of
standing. With one notable exception, taxpayers-for good reason-lack
standing in federal court. The voice of the taxpayer is the voice of policy,
and the decision whether to raise taxes or how to spend the accumulated
revenue belongs in the policy-making branches of the government, rather
than the judiciary. The general denial of taxpayer standing thus separates
the powers in a practical and understandable way.
In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,' taxpayers who
politically opposed President George W. Bush's sponsorship of conferences
to promote the inclusion of faith-based social service providers in
government programs sued to stop him. Why were taxpayers able to make a
federal case out of their political opposition? Good question, and the answer
is a Warren Court mistake. It is a mistake that tied both sides in the Hein
oral argument in knots, and left the Court perplexed. After Solicitor General
Clement struggled gamely for some minutes trying to shore up the Warren
Court handiwork, Justice Alito thoughtfully asked, "[A]re you ... arguing
that these lines that you're drawing make a lot of sense ... [o]r are you just
arguing that this is the best that can be done... within the body of precedent
that the Court has handed down in this area?",2 When Clement said "[t]he
latter," the Court breathed a sigh of relief and Justice Stevens wondered out
* Caruso Family Chair & Professor of Constitutional Law, Pepperdine University
1. 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Hein, 127 S. Ct. 2553 (No. 06-157), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/06-157.pdf.
loud whether his fellow Justices thought they had "a duty to follow
precedents that don't make any sense."3
In Flast v. Cohen,4 the Warren Court disregarded settled principles of
constitutional litigation and sauntered off in its own direction. Flast held
that taxpayers had standing to challenge the use of funds under the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, a law that provided
educational assistance to public and religious schools alike in mathematics,
reading, and other subjects.' The inclusion of religious schools in this
educational assistance was claimed to be an unconstitutional establishment
of religion.6 It is not deemed so now, as modem precedent more or less
says, but Warren thought differently, so he bent the rules to allow the
taxpayers into court.
Allowing the challenge to that portion of the legislative expenditure
shared with religious schools, Warren gave only lip service to the
importance of standing. This was jurisprudential error, and as discussed
below, it compounds some unfortunate misinterpretation of the
Establishment Clause.
Flast invented a two-part standard. First, taxpayers had to establish a
logical link between that status and a spending measure.7 Second, taxpayers
had to establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the
constitutional infringement alleged.8 The formula has been committed to
memory by every law student since, but unfortunately for the separation of
powers, it meant nothing. As Justice John Marshall Harlan II in dissent
thoughtfully pointed out, neither of the Flast factors did anything to
differentiate an Establishment-Clause taxpayer case from any other
grievance a taxpayer might have with a spending measure.9  The
requirements were at best makeweights, both could be easily fulfilled, and
both were off point in terms of keeping courts focused on the resolution of
specific disputes on the basis of written law. It was not as if, Harlan pointed
out, the complaining taxpayer under the two-factor test would get a refund if
he prevailed: "The taxpayer cannot ask the return of any portion of his
previous tax payments, cannot prevent the collection of any existing tax
debt, and cannot demand an adjudication of the propriety of any particular
level of taxation," remarked Harlan,10 "[H]is tax payments are received for
3. Id.
4. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
5. Id. at 105-06.
6. Id. at 85-86.
7. Id. at 102.
8. Id. at 102-03.
9. See id at 124-26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 128.
e I nJIu
[Vol. 35: 509, 2008] Standing Still
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
the general purposes of the United States, and are, upon proper receipt, lost
in the general revenues.""
Moreover, there is no good reason to think that the Establishment
Clause creates any more limits on the spending power than do other
constitutional provisions, such as due process or equal protection, rights for
which no taxpayer standing exists. Said Harlan, "I can attach no
constitutional significance to the various degrees of specificity with which
these limitations appear in the terms or history of the Constitution.,"
12
The Roberts Court had an opportunity to undo the Flast mistake in its
entirety, but chose instead only to apply it to the Hein dispute. The case was
thus resolved narrowly. After Hein, taxpayers had no standing to challenge
the expenditures not specifically traceable to a legislative enactment that
allegedly violates the Establishment Clause.'3 Justice Alito wrote that the
line of precedent following Flast had never extended that case beyond its
facts.' 4 He emphasized its "narrow application" and held that "[t]he link
between congressional action and constitutional violation that supported
taxpayer standing in Flast is missing here."' 5 Further, the Court rejected the
Freedom from Religion Foundation's argument that a distinction between
executive and congressional expenditures was arbitrary. 16 The Court noted
that the Flast exception to the general standing rule was specifically in
relation to Congress' taxing and spending power, and that an executive
expenditure from general funds was too attenuated from that to confer
standing. " Such an extension "would surely create difficult and
uncomfortable line-drawing problems."'18  If an egregious violation were
11. Id.
12. Id. at 127.
13. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2568 (2007) (plurality
opinion). It is not merely a distinction between executive and legislative spending. See, e.g.,
Hinrichs v. Speaker of House of Representatives of Ind. Gen. Assembly, 506 F.3d 584, 598-99 (7th
Cir. 2007) (finding no standing after Hein in a case where a taxpayer challenged a legislative admin-
istrative rule inviting visiting clerics to give an invocation). The plurality in Hein explained: "[T]his
case falls outside the 'narrow exception' that Flast 'created to the general rule against taxpayer
standing established in Frothingham' because "the expenditures that respondents challenge were
not expressly authorized or mandated by any specific congressional enactment." Hein, 127 S. Ct. at
2568 (plurality opinion). The key distinction is whether the lawsuit is directed at an exercise of con-
gressional power, and thus has the "requisite 'logical nexus' between taxpayer status 'and the type of
legislative enactment attacked."' Id. at 2568 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 102).
14. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568 (plurality opinion).
15. Id. at 2566.
16. Id. at 2568.
17. Id. at 2563.
18. Id. at 2570.
committed, as the Foundation speculated, Congress could step in, or a
plaintiff with a more definite harm2" could bring suit. Finally, the Court
concluded that it was not necessary to address the continuing validity of
Flast, since "a precedent is not always expanded to the limit of its logic."'"
Justice Kennedy, who joined the Hein opinion in full, wrote separately
to emphasize why the separation of powers does not permit Flast's
extension. 22 Extending Flast would make the exception "boundless," and
would call into question the freedom of the Executive to experiment with
creative responses, even religious ones, to governmental concerns. 23 There
cannot be "constant supervision," wrote Justice Kennedy of Executive
operations and dialogues, or the Court would end up in the inappropriate role
of "speech editors" or Executive "event planners., 24 In a concurrence in the
judgment (joined by Justice Thomas), Justice Scalia sought to undo Flast
altogether. He wrote that "if this Court is to decide cases by rule of law
rather than show of hands, we must surrender to logic and choose sides"
between taking Flast to its logical conclusion or overruling it.2 5  He
distinguished between "Psychic Injury" and "Wallet Injury" for the purpose
of taxpayer challenges. 26  Wallet Injuries, he expounded, were a concrete
type of injury, but Psychic Injuries were too attenuated from the expenditure
to be traceable and redressable, as standing rules require.27 Psychic Injuries
consist of the mental displeasure of thinking one's tax money is being used
for unlawful purposes. 28 The Flast exception, he noted, conferred standing
"only if the constitutional provision allegedly violated is a specific limitation
on the taxing and spending power" and only in Psychic Injury cases. 29 This
was squarely at odds with the normal rule that there is no standing based on
the "generalized grievance that the law is being violated."30 Further, it made
19. Id. at 2571.
20. The difficulty of what counts as a more "definite harm" is of course bound up with the under-
lying interpretation of the Establishment Clause. As Justice Scalia outlines in his concurrence in the
judgment, he understands this as unlikely to include mere "psychic" injury. Id. at 2574. So then,
who does have standing to challenge the hypothetical presidential decision to use discretionary funds
to build a mosque on the White House lawn? Presumably, an otherwise qualified, non-Islamic con-
tractor could challenge an exclusion of his services based on his personal faith, but one would not
necessarily conclude that other faiths, merely because the president exercised his discretion against
building a church or synagogue, would have an injury under Hein.
21. Id. at 2571.
22. Id. at 2572-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 2573.
24. Id.
25. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.).
26. Id. at 2574.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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no sense, if a true injury had occurred, to restrict standing to cases involving
the Taxing and Spending Clause, disallowing cases, for example, originating
out of unconstitutional uses of the Property Clause by Congress.3
Given the persuasiveness of the Scalia opinion, what lies behind the
hesitation of the Roberts Court to overrule Flast altogether, other than the
obvious need for Justice Kennedy's fifth vote? In writing for the plurality,
Justice Alito conceded the validity of much of Justice Scalia's analysis,
32
and at oral argument, the Chief Justice had suggested that the
executive/legislative line the plurality ultimately accepted was little more
than formalism. 33 Notably, efforts by Andrew Pincus for the Freedom from
Religion Foundation to add even more bells and whistles, like a "non-
incidental" use of appropriated funds for a core religious purpose, led at oral
argument to protracted discussions of how many bagels could be purchased
for a prayer breakfast or how many Secret Service personnel could attend to
the president when he attended a religiously-sponsored event. There were
no satisfactory responses, and so the skimpy ruling by the plurality looks
odd. While Chief Justice Roberts prefers narrow rulings that build
consensus, he also presumably favors clarity and logic. The anomalous
Establishment-Clause taxpayer standing exception is incapable of yielding
that. Justices Souter and Breyer seem its strongest defenders, loosely
referencing Madison's famous Memorial and Remonstrance and positing
that people who are "upset" about religion need a cause of action.35 With
respect, this is mis-citing Madison, whose famous Remonstrance challenged
the coercive taking of even "three pence" not for the otherwise disinterested
taxpayer "upset" by the inclusion of faith groups in a general program, but
for the compelled support of an established church and coerced
"conformity" thereto. That is a substantial difference.
There is little question but that the Warren Court's anomalous
Establishment-Clause standing doctrine has drawn the Supreme Court into
disputes over the evenhanded inclusion of religious schools in federal grant
programs. It also has enmeshed the judiciary in all manner of challenges to
religious holiday displays and the after-hours use of schools' empty
classrooms by student religious clubs. To the extent that citizens disagree
31. See generally Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
32. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572 (plurality opinion).
33. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 39.
34. Id. at 38-40.
35. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2585 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183,
186 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1901)).
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about these matters, the political process should resolve them. Religious
divisiveness is heightened, not lessened, by empowering one side to run into
court brandishing an exclusionary interpretation of the Establishment
Clause. As Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. admonished, the courts are not the
only defenders of the Constitution, and the other branches of government
"are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as
great a degree as the courts."36
So again, why not toss Flast now? Because, as Mother used to say,
"The soup is not ready yet." In particular, a majority of judicial chefs were
not prepared to say how the undoing of the illegitimacy of Flast would affect
the perhaps equally problematic (from the vantage-point of constitutional
misconstruction) "no endorsement" view. The primary benefit of the modest
decision in Hein is that it gives the Roberts Court an opportunity to re-think
the underlying religion-clause jurisprudence more carefully. The retirement
of Justice O'Connor and the addition of Chief Justice John Roberts and
Justice Samuel Alito create a favorable climate for a return to original
understanding. As with other substantive areas, Justice Kennedy will likely
play a pivotal role. Kennedy is sometimes said to occupy this position
elsewhere, however, because of ambivalence; in the context of
Establishment Clause interpretation, it is likely he simply believes his views
are correct. Justice Kennedy has long dissented from the O'Connor idea
which substituted "no endorsement" for the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause. In its most recent application in the Ten
Commandments cases,37 the O'Connor approach yielded an outcome that
found such displays to be unacceptable in a courthouse in Kentucky, but just
fine on the state-house lawn in Texas. Such inconsistency has led Justice
Kennedy to describe the no-endorsement theory as "flawed in its
fundamentals and unworkable in practice, ' 38 productive of "bizarre
result."'3 9
The no-endorsement idea was always something of a non sequitur, even
by Justice O'Connor's own description. O'Connor had originated the idea
not from original meaning, historical practice, or precedent, but from what
36. Mo., Kan., & Tex. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904). Rejecting Flast would not
mean that proper Establishment Clause cases could not be heard. Obviously, where a taxpayer or
any other citizen is coerced or disadvantaged by a prescribed imposition under law of a religious
belief or practice, standing would exist. Similarly, as Justice Harlan pointed out, standing is appro-
priate for a challenge brought to a tax specifically designed for the support of religion. Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 116 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). This again was the Virginia assessment
opposed by James Madison.
37. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
38. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
39. Id.
514
[Vol. 35: 509, 2008] Standing Still
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
she termed "a clarification of our Establishment Clause doctrine. 4 ° Writing
a concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, involving a creche display case
from Rhode Island, O'Connor postulated that the Establishment Clause
"prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any
way to a person's standing in the political community."' 41 By itself, this is a
proposition reasonably sustainable as it is bolstered not only by the original
no-legal-coercion standard of the religion clauses, but also by the prohibition
against religious test oaths. But Justice O'Connor deduced something far
broader; namely, the proposition that the government violates the
Constitution either through "endorsement or disapproval of religion., 42 By
this, O'Connor puts her theory in direct conflict with George Washington's
farewell insight about the importance of religion to the nation's prosperity,43
as well as the presupposition in the Declaration of Independence of a Creator
and man's natural yearning for the transcendent captured well by such
venerable American observers as Tocqueville. O'Connor thus made a
founding precept into a constitutional transgression.
Some of our fellow citizens, of course, do dissent from the influence of
religion. The Speech Clause in the First Amendment affirms this right of
dissent.44 What neither the Speech nor Religion Clauses envisioned was that
dissenting voices had the equivalent of a heckler's veto to weaken or erase
the basis upon which the nation was incorporated. Yes, a person's legal
standing could not be made to turn on belief or practice, but an endorsement
of religion generally without imposed legal consequence is simply not that.
Failure to see this difference invites a level of judicial micro-management of
human freedom-including the trivial aspects of the decor of holiday
displays-that is seldom justifiable in any area of the law, let alone an area
like religion where Hamilton observed that the federal government was
without competence.45
Justice O'Connor resisted an originalist interpretation of the
Establishment Clause in the belief that it would render free exercise
40. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 688.
43. President George Washington, The Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796) at 20, available at
http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/documents/farewell/transcript.html#p20.
44. As a matter of logic and consistency, a nonbeliever would not rely on the protection of free
exercise.
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). In this regard, Justice O'Connor approved
of a holiday display of a creche when part of a larger exhibit with secular objects, but not when it
was alone or with insufficient secular message. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 (1984).
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protection redundant.46 O'Connor derived this redundancy concern from the
school prayer cases and some scholarly commentary,4 7 which had asserted
(incorrectly) that legal coercion was unnecessary to find an impermissible
establishment. 4' Redundant protection of a fragile individual right is hardly
problematic. Legal coercion should be put back at the heart of both clauses
to ensure their correct construal. The clauses simply protect freedom from
coerced belief or practice in two separate ways-by granting an immunity
from both legally coerced prescription (no establishment) and legally
coerced prohibition (free exercise). Religious liberty is sacrificed either
when people are forced to worship at a church not of their own choosing or
are stopped from praying in a chosen manner. Jurisprudentially, any modem
redundancy that exists is the likely consequence of judicially incorporating
against the states that which was intended as a federalism protection for state
establishments.
One misconstruction of a clause does not justify another,
however-especially when it yields the unintended exclusion of a central
aspect of human nature. Interpreting the Establishment Clause to demand
wholesale secularity is judicial fabrication. The Flast mistake compounded
the canard and perplexed all manner of government programs, inviting
inscrutable distinctions between types of public support. Books, but not
maps, could be given to religious schools, for example, because the former
could be certified for wholly secular use, whereas requests for the use of
maps-presumably containing the Holy Land-were required to be denied.
An exasperated Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan was heard to remark,
"What about an atlas-a, book of maps?' 49 The "no-endorsement" theory
was simply a regrettable extension of this confusion. "No endorsement" had
a facade of necessity only because it was thought necessary to avoid coerced
prayer in public school. It was not. An Establishment Clause violation
premised upon protection from legal coercion, including that exercised by
public school teachers, would have been sufficient.
If it is reasonable to speculate that the Roberts Court did not want to
fully close the standing door until the newly composed Court could
reasonably address the Establishment Clause and better return it to its
46. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668-69.
47. See School Dist. ofAbington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (holding that "[tihe dis-
tinction between the two clauses is apparent-a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated
on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended"); see also Douglas
Laycock, "Nonpreferential "Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 875, 922 (1986) ("If coercion is also an element of the [Ejstablishment [C]lause, establish-
ment adds nothing to free exercise[.]").
48. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 668-69.
49. Jeffrey Rosen, Is Nothing Secular?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, available at
http://query.nytime.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D07E7D7143CF933A05752COA9669C8B63&sec =
&spon=&pagewanted=5.
516
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intended purpose, how might that re-thinking be accomplished? Justice
Kennedy helpfully began the work of reconnecting no establishment with
coercion in Lee v. Weisman. ° While Kennedy's view of coercion was more
psychological than faithfully legal in Weisman, it was clearly headed in the
right direction. In addition, it is part of the legacy of the late Chief Justice
William Rehnquist-shared in by Justice Kennedy-that there be greater
acceptance of nonpreferential assistance to all schools, especially through
vouchers, 51 thereby removing another precedential support for the overly
exclusionary no-endorsement idea.
The no-endorsement idea should be abandoned because only by setting
aside the extraneous and subjective can the Establishment Clause be
redirected at improper legal coercion. The most important consequence of
re-focusing the Establishment Clause on legal coercion would be the
uprooting of the exclusionary impulse mistakenly accepted since Everson v.
Board of Education.52  In introducing what would become the First
Amendment, James Madison made plain that the purpose of the religion
clauses was the avoidance of legal coercion in the form of a national church,
or of legal penalties or disabilities imposed because of the making of a
personal faith choice other than a nationally favored one. By their terms,
these clauses applied only to the national government. Indeed, the
phraseology of the Amendment was intended to insulate various state
establishments from national interference.53 Instead of a focus on legal
50. 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (finding impermissible coercion in the context of a middle school
graduation, where the prayer originated with the state officer (the school principal), the person se-
lected to pray was designated by the state officer, and the prayer was then authored subject to the
direction of the state officer).
51. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
52. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
53. On June 8, 1789, James Madison rose in the House of Representatives and "reminded the
House that this was the day that he had heretofore named for bringing forward amendments to the
Constitution." I ANNALS OF CONG. 424 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). Madison's subsequent remarks in
urging the House to adopt his drafts of the proposed amendments were less those of a dedicated ad-
vocate of the wisdom of such measures than those of a prudent statesman seeking the enactment of
measures sought by a number of his fellow citizens which could surely do no harm and might do a
great deal of good.
The language Madison proposed for what ultimately became the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment was this: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or
worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of con-
science be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed." Id. at 434.
On the same day Madison proposed them, the amendments which formed the basis for the Bill
of Rights were referred by the House to a Committee of the Whole, and after several weeks' delay
were then referred to a Select Committee consisting of Madison and ten others. The Committee re-
vised Madison's proposal regarding the establishment of religion to read: "[N]o religion shall be
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coercion at the national level, since the late 1940s, this protection against
federal imposition has become an instrument by which a wholly secular
national and state environment might be achieved. 54 In this, neutrality was
redefined-not as between faiths, but between faith and no faith. In its 1947
decision in Everson, the Supreme Court, under the guise of neutrality,
articulated the exclusionary view that government may not aid religion
generally 55-a truly extraordinary proposition for a nation informed by the
"Laws of Nature and of Nature's God." While subsequent to Everson the
Establishment Clause case law has taken the numerous twists and turns that
exasperated Senator Moynihan, it proceeded primarily in an exclusionary
progression. For example, as Everson became Lemon v. Kurtzman,5 6 it was
understood as prohibiting: (1) any public support for religion in purpose or
effect; (2) any government action that might be perceived by a hypothetical
observer as an endorsement of religion generally; and (3) the inclusion of
established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed." Id. at 729.
The Committee's proposed revisions were debated in the House on August 15, 1789. The en-
tire debate on the Religion Clauses is contained in two full columns of the "Annals." Representative
Peter Sylvester of New York expressed his dislike for the revised version, because it might "have a
tendency to abolish religion altogether." Id. Representative John Vining suggested that the two
parts of the sentence be transposed; Representative Elbridge Gerry thought the language should be
changed to read "that no religious doctrine shall be established by law." Id. at 730. Representative
Roger Sherman of Connecticut had the traditional reason for opposing provisions of a Bill of
Rights-that Congress had no delegated authority to "make religious establishments"--and therefore
he opposed the adoption of the amendment. Id. Representative Daniel Carroll of Maryland thought
it desirable to adopt the words proposed, saying "[h]e would not contend with gentlemen about the
phraseology, his object was to secure the substance in such a manner as to satisfy the wishes of the
honest part of the community." Id.
Madison then spoke, and said that "he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Con-
gress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men
to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience." Id. He said that some of the state con-
ventions had thought that Congress might rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause to infringe the
rights of conscience or to establish a national religion, and "to prevent these effects he presumed the
amendment was intended, and he thought it as well expressed as the nature of the language would
admit." Id.
Representative Benjamin Huntington then expressed the view that the Committee's language
might "be taken in such latitude as to be extremely hurtful to the cause of religion. He understood
the amendment to mean what had been expressed by the gentleman from Virginia; but others might
find it convenient to put another construction upon it." Huntington, from Connecticut, was con-
cerned that in the New England states, where state-established religions were the rule rather than the
exception, the federal courts might not be able to entertain claims based upon an obligation under the
bylaws of a religious organization to contribute to the support of a minister or the building of a place
of worship. He hoped that "the amendment would be made in such a way as to secure the rights of
conscience, and a free exercise of the rights of religion, but not to patronise those who professed no
religion at all." Id. at 730-3 1.
54. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 197 (1992),
cited with approval in Capitol Square v. Pinnette, 515 U.S. 753, 817 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that a "negative bar against establishment of religion implies affirmative establishment
of secular public order").
55. Everson v. Bd. ofEd. ofEwing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
56. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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religious bodies in governmental programs that provide direct subsidies or
in-kind benefits. Modem interpretation of the Establishment Clause was
thus troubled not only by an unanticipated application of the clause to
national and state government alike, but also an embedded bias toward
secularity, disguised as neutrality.
The incorporation of the Establishment Clause against the states, while
perhaps the most obvious break with original understanding, is also the one
needing least attention. Respect was given to state establishments at the
founding as an aspect of federalist bargaining rather than as acceptance of
the coercion such establishments represented. Insofar as a state
establishment would likely run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause today, 57 it
is an academic exercise without policy merit to advocate the undoing of the
judicial incorporation of the Establishment Clause against the states. There
is no constituency for state establishment, nor should there be.
What does have merit is returning to the original meaning of the word
"establishment" as it now applies to both the national and state governments.
The Framers understood an establishment "necessarily [to] involve actual
legal coercion., 58 Lee v. Weisman5 9 edged the Court back in this direction,
though as mentioned, Justice Kennedy there defined coercion too
expansively. As Justice Scalia would point out in dissent, "The coercion
that was a hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of
religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of
penalty., 60 Moreover, the financial support interdicted by the Establishment
Clause was not for religion generally or a public program that included
religious providers, 61 but rather the compulsory patronage of certain
religious services and the mandatory payment of taxes supporting ministers.
Were the Establishment Clause properly construed, public religious
displays or acknowledgments which today are ensnared in Justice
O'Connor's "no-endorsement" theory would be unobjectionable.6 2 Thus,
based on the original meaning of the Establishment Clause, Ten
Commandments displays, the historical Latin Cross on Mt. Soledad, and
Menorahs and creches displayed during the holiday season would be fully
constitutional. None of these symbolic efforts impose constitutional injury,
57. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 729 n.3 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
58. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 52 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment).
59. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
60. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Cf Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
62. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
for they do not compel belief or action under law. Returning to the original
meaning thus simplifies constitutional adjudication, but it also importantly
avoids the extraordinary costs and divisiveness associated with litigation
campaigns that make even the most minor mention of religion into complex
federal litigation. Such litigation has led to unsatisfactory and uneven
results: unsatisfactory because the outcomes often require draining religious
symbols of their meaning; uneven because there is understandable hesitation
to expunge the significance of religious reference in light of the corporate
presupposition of a Creator. Few principled lines can now be drawn. As
Justice Thomas remarked in his concurrence in Van Orden, "this Court's
jurisprudence leaves courts, governments, and believers and nonbelievers
alike confused .... ,63 The confusion need not be perpetuated.
To the nonbeliever or dedicated secularist, however, doctrinal confusion
is preferable to the restoration of religious reference. Religious reference is
antithetical to contemporary skepticism and the re-founding of America
upon a conception of human nature that is more desire and emotion-and, of
course, personal gratification-than the self-evident truth of created
equality. But if reason is made subordinate to desire, the prospects for
religious freedom-indeed, for any freedom-are dim. As Professor Robert
George has asked, what ultimately is the source of human right if it is neither
God nor reason? 64 There may be none, other than an autonomy principle
that nominally honors consent, but is then in tension with a secularist
conception of man as the sum of desires prompted largely by external
stimuli beyond his conscious freedom. This, of course, contrasts sharply
with the founding corporate presupposition of the Divine origin of man,
reflected in the Declaration's affirmation of man's intrinsic value (the
possessor of inalienable right) and his reasoned pursuit of happiness.
Far more than Christmas displays are thus in play when religious
freedom mutates into a secularist orthodoxy. After all, the "more perfect
63. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Newdow,
542 U.S. at 45 n.1 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (collecting cases)). The follow-
ing religious references have been successfully challenged: a sign noting that a public building
would be closed for Good Friday, Granzeier v. Middleton, 955 F. Supp. 741, 743, 743 n.2, 746-47
(E.D. Ky. 1997), affd on other grounds, 173 F.3d 568, 576 (6th Cir. 1999); a cross in the Mojave
honoring war dead, Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1204-05, 1215-17 (C.D. Cal. 2002); and
municipal seals, which have been frequent targets for religious erasure, see, e.g., Robinson v. Ed-
mond, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995); Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F. 2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991);
Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo County., 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
64. Robert P. George, A Clash of Orthodoxies, FIRST THINGS 33 (Aug./Sept. 1999), available at
http://www.firstthings.com/article.php3?idarticle=3195.
If reason is purely instrumental and can't tell us what to want but only how to get to what
we want, how can we say that people have a fundamental right to freedom of speech?
Freedom of the press? Freedom of religion? Privacy? Where do those fundamental
rights come from? What is their basis? Why respect someone else's rights?
Id.
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union" 65 of the Constitution is fashioned to "fulfill the promise," as one
Chief Justice remarked of the Declaration.66 It is intended to facilitate man's
flourishing in a community of other men. Human flourishing in the natural
law tradition of the Declaration is necessarily bound up with the basic
human goods of life, knowledge, family, friendship, and religion.67
Augustine opined that one can always tell the nature of a people by the
object of their love.68 Insofar as these basic human goods can be said to be
the product of reasoned deduction from the incorporating presupposition in
the Declaration, what would be objects of our love if we are aggressively
separated from them by imposed secularity?
The Roberts Court has yet to begin the journey back toward a
historically faithful account of religious freedom. However, the opinion in
Hein implicitly recognizes that the journey back is made far more difficult
when the structural limitations on judicial power are not observed.69 Even
prior to Hein, the Roberts Court has shown a special interest both in standing
and in maintaining the jurisdictional integrity of the judicial function, as
shown by its decision in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno70 unanimously
refusing to extend Flast7' to allow a taxpayer challenge to state investment
65. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
66. This eloquent short-hand summary of the relation between the Declaration and the Constitu-
tion is attributed to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, as chairman of the bicentennial celebration of
the Constitution. Charles Alan Wright, In Memoriam: Warren Burger: A Younger Friend Remem-
bers, 74 TEX. L. REV. 213, 219 (1995); see also Akhil Amar & Douglas W. Kmiec, The Constitu-
tion 'to secure these rights,' introductory essay to THE POCKET CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (National Constitution Center ed. 2003); Clarence Thomas, Toward a "Plain Reading" of
the Constitution-The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L. J.
983, 994 (1987) ("The proper way to interpret the Civil War amendments is as extensions of the
promise of the original Constitution which in turn was intended to fulfill the promise of the Declara-
tion.").
67. See generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980) for a somewhat
differently stated exposition of incommensurate, basic human goods.
68. St. Augustine writes:
[F]or example, if one should say, 'A people is the association of a multitude of rational
beings united by a common agreement on the objects of their love', then it follows that to
observe the character of a particular people, we must examine the objects of its love.
And yet, whatever those objects, if it is the association of a multitude not of animals but
of rational beings, and is united by a common agreement about the objects of its love,
then there is no absurdity in applying to it the title of a 'people.' And, obviously, the bet-
ter the objects of this agreement, the better the people; the worse the objects of this love,
the worse the people.
ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD bk. XIX 890 (Henry Bettenson trans., Penguin Books 2003)
(1467).
69. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2570 (2007).
70. 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006).
71. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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tax credits that allegedly discriminated against interstate commerce. 72 Hein
invited the Court to rid itself once and for all of Flast's inevitable
insinuation of the Court into policy questions. 73 That the Court declined the
invitation 74-for now-may suggest merely that the fine-grained
distinctions drawn by Justice Alito for the plurality are serviceable until such
time as the Court is also prepared to free itself of the highly subjective no-
endorsement inquiry. To have made it more justiciably difficult to reach
Establishment Clause questions before the Clause, itself, had been repaired
would have been imprudent. There is an unmistakable sorority between the
mythical justiciability of Flast and the equally mythic psychic injury at the
core of no endorsement.
72. DaimlerChrysler, 126 S. Ct. at 1865.
73. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568.
74. Id.
